The statement “glocalization is the evolution of production” is amended: the evidence supports “glocalization is the latest stage in the evolution of production, in which production moves toward its markets and materials and comes to be governed in the place where it happens,” and the record to November 2026 shows the first half arriving as regionalization under the same owners as before, while the second half remains small.
Overview
The statement makes two claims at once. One is about where things are made. The other is about who decides how they are made. The theories of industrial location and trade, from Alfred Weber in 1909 to Richard Baldwin in 2016, speak to the first. The wiki’s sense of glocalization depends on the second, because on this site the word names an economy whose production is governed by the place that lives with it.
On location, the record since 2008 shows real change. The share of world trade that passes through global value chains reached about 52 percent in 2008 and has not grown since (World Bank, World Development Report 2020). China’s surplus rural labor was absorbed in the 2000s and real wages there have risen since 2003. Shipping risk became a priced input again: war-risk cover for a transit of the Strait of Hormuz cost 0.10 to 0.25 percent of a ship’s hull value before the conflict that began on 28 February 2026, and 3.5 to 7.5 percent by July 2026, according to Singapore’s Ministry of Transport. The European Union began charging for carbon embedded in some imports on 1 January 2026. Weber’s model predicts that each of these changes pulls plants toward their markets.
The same record shows the move running mostly toward political blocs. McKinsey Global Institute found that the average geopolitical distance of trade fell about 7 percent between 2017 and 2024 while the average geographic distance kept rising by about 10 kilometers a year, and concluded that “nearshoring does not yet appear to be happening on a global scale.” Kearney’s 2026 Reshoring Index stayed negative for the United States: US imports from mainland China fell by about US$135 billion in 2025 and imports from 13 other Asian low-cost countries rose by about US$193 billion. The owners and buyers at the head of these chains did not change.
Production owned and governed in place exists at measurable scale, in cooperatives and in citizen-owned energy. No series found for this brief shows it growing faster than conventional investment, and the one trend measured (citizen ownership of German renewable capacity) is falling. A practitioner can say that the conditions that made long-distance, low-wage production pay have weakened. A practitioner cannot yet say that production is passing into place-based governance.
Right of reply
This page describes companies, governments, international agencies and consultancies only through their published statistics, reports, filings and statements. None has been invited to comment. Corrections and responses will be recorded on this page. On this site, [MS] marks a claim that rests on the account of the party the claim is about, or on the wiki’s own project documents. In this brief it also marks figures from firms that sell the services the figure bears on (reshoring advice, relocation to Mexico).
The four problems, resolved
Stage or sequence
TIME names a whole sequence: four forms of coordination, each building on the last, all still operating. Glocalization, as the wiki defines it, names one form tied to one phase of the S-curve. No sequence of production forms in the literature carries all of TIME’s properties (see “Is there an evolution of production?” below). The parallel holds as a claim about a stage. The amended wording therefore calls glocalization “the latest stage” and leaves the sequence itself unnamed. A candidate sequence is set out below as Michael’s proposal for testing.
Production or economy
The wiki’s Glocalization page defines an economic form that covers governance, finance and measurement, with cosmo-local production as the production rule inside it. The evidence gathered here bears on where production happens and who owns it. It says almost nothing about finance or measurement. Production is one plane of glocalization. The amended statement keeps production as its subject because that is the plane the location literature can test, and it should be read as a claim about that plane alone.
Location or organization
The evidence separates the two cleanly. Location has shifted: China’s share of US manufactured imports fell, Mexico and Southeast Asia gained, and new US plants were announced in semiconductors and batteries. Governance has not shifted on any comparable scale. UNCTAD reports that foreign direct investment into Mexico rose 16 percent in 2025 to US$44 billion, “largely reflecting higher investment in export-oriented manufacturing facilities,” with reinvested earnings of firms already there a significant share. A plant that moves from Guangdong to Monterrey under the same owner is a change of location. The record supports the location claim in its regional form and does not yet support the governance claim.
Structural or political
Both forces are present, and policy explains most of the measured shift since 2018. The clearest structural driver is labor. Chinese real wages began rising steeply around 2003, fifteen years before the 2018 tariffs (Zhang, Yang and Wang 2011). The political driver is visible in Kearney’s March 2026 executive survey, in which 75 percent of respondents reported switching country of origin away from China to other low-cost countries and 20 percent reported looking at domestic manufacturing, after a year in which the effective US tariff on Chinese goods settled at 27 to 30 percent. MGI’s finding that trade realigns by political alignment while its physical distance grows is the signature of bloc formation. Regionalization since 2018 is mainly fragmentation into blocs, laid over an older structural erosion of the labor saving that drove offshoring.
Five moves kept apart
| Move | What happens | Who governs afterward | Matches the wiki’s glocalization? |
|---|---|---|---|
| [[glossary/m-s/reshoring | Reshoring]] | Production returns to the firm’s home country | The same firm |
| [[glossary/m-s/nearshoring | Nearshoring]] | Production moves to a neighboring country | The same firm or its suppliers |
| [[glossary/f-l/friendshoring | Friendshoring]] | Production moves to a politically aligned country | The same firm or its suppliers |
| Regionalization | Trade concentrates within a world region or bloc | Mixed, mostly existing owners | No |
| Relocalization | Production returns to the place of consumption | Varies; matches only when governed in place | Only under place-based governance |
Sources that use glocalization for a central firm adapting products to local markets are labeled “corporate sense” in this brief. Sources that use it for a rescaling of governance (Swyngedouw) are labeled “governance sense.”
The theories
Weber: least cost location
Alfred Weber’s Über den Standort der Industrien (1909), translated by Carl Joachim Friedrich as Theory of the Location of Industries (1929), treats the siting of a plant as a cost problem, whose answer is the least cost location. The firm first finds the point that minimizes the cost of moving materials in and product out, then asks whether a cheaper labor supply or the savings of a cluster justify moving away from it.
- The locational triangle is the simplest case: two sources of material and one market, with the plant somewhere inside.
- The material index is the weight of localized materials divided by the weight of the product. Above one, the plant is pulled toward materials. Below one, toward the market.
- Isodapanes are lines joining points where the added transport cost, above the minimum, is equal.
- Under the labor deviation, the firm moves to a cheap-labor site if that site lies inside the critical isodapane, the line on which the added transport cost equals the labor saving.
- The agglomeration deviation works the same way for the savings from clustering with other firms.
Secondary accounts state Weber’s method in three steps: find the transport optimum, then adjust for labor, then adjust for agglomeration. This brief did not obtain the Friedrich translation, so the passage in which Weber states the labor deviation is paraphrased and a verbatim quotation remains [TBV].
The standard critiques are that demand is fixed at points, so the model has no market area; that prices are given, so it has no price competition; and that input proportions are fixed. Edgar Hoover (The Location of Economic Activity, 1948) added terminal costs and freight rates that fall in steps with distance. August Lösch (Die räumliche Ordnung der Wirtschaft, 1940) moved the problem to profit maximization over market areas. Walter Isard (1956) folded Weber into general economics.
Correction to the description supplied: the account of least cost and the labor deviation is accurate. It should add that Weber fixed demand and input proportions, and that the use of his model to explain international offshoring is a later extension by others.
The substitution principle
The substitution principle comes from general neoclassical economics: a producer substitutes one input for another at the margin until their relative costs balance. Andreas Predöhl applied it to location in “Das Standortsproblem in der Wirtschaftstheorie” (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 1925) and in English in “The Theory of Location in Its Relation to General Economics” (Journal of Political Economy, 1928). Isard’s 1949 article in the Quarterly Journal of Economics treated Predöhl’s principle explicitly, and his Location and Space-Economy (1956) combined it with Weber’s framework, so that choosing a location became a choice of how to substitute transport inputs for other inputs. Leon Moses (“Location and the Theory of Production,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1958) completed the merger by letting the proportions of production inputs vary with location, which Weber had held fixed.
Correction: “an offshoot of Weber” reverses the lineage. The principle came from general economics, and Predöhl first stated it for location in 1925. Isard and Moses used it to absorb Weber, whose deviations become special cases of substitution.
The New International Division of Labor
Folker Fröbel, Jürgen Heinrichs and Otto Kreye (Die neue internationale Arbeitsteilung, 1977; English edition 1980) argued that the classical international division of labor, in which developing countries supplied raw materials to industrial ones, was giving way to a new one, the new international division of labor, in which developing countries were chosen as sites for manufacturing goods competitive on the world market. They framed it as a continuing process driven by conditions of capital accumulation in the core economies. They named three preconditions:
- a worldwide reserve of low-paid labor;
- the subdivision of production into simple tasks that unskilled workers could learn quickly;
- transport and communication technology that made dispersed production manageable from a center.
The main critique is that several East Asian economies upgraded into complex, capital-intensive sectors and built their own firms, an outcome the thesis did not anticipate (reviewed in Starosta 2016). The global value chain literature has since taken over most of the field.
Correction: the description of the three preconditions is accurate. It should add that the authors described relocation as an ongoing process driven from the core, and that East Asian upgrading is the record that most challenges it.
Absolute and comparative advantage
Adam Smith (The Wealth of Nations, 1776) argued for importing what another country makes at lower absolute cost, the basis of absolute advantage. David Ricardo (Principles, 1817, chapter 7) showed that trade pays even when Portugal makes both wine and cloth with less labor than England, because each country gains by specializing according to relative opportunity cost. Robert Torrens stated a version in 1815, and priority remains disputed.
Three points follow.
-
Comparative advantage rests on relative productivity. A country with abundant cheap labor that exports labor-intensive goods is described by the Heckscher-Ohlin model of factor endowments (Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933), in which countries export goods that use their abundant factor intensively. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem (1941) added that trade raises the real return of the abundant factor and lowers that of the scarce one. The description supplied blends the two where it says countries specialize because labor is cheap there.
-
Ricardo assumed capital would stay at home, and wrote so in chapter 7: “Experience, however, shews, that the fancied or real insecurity of capital, when not under the immediate control of its owner, together with the natural disinclination which every man has to quit the country of his birth and connexions, and intrust himself with all his habits fixed, to a strange government and new laws, checks the emigration of capital.” Herman Daly and John Cobb (For the Common Good, 1989) argued that once capital moves freely across borders it follows absolute advantage, which removes the ground of Ricardo’s argument. Trade economists reply that comparative advantage still operates over factors that do not move, chiefly labor and land, and that models in the Heckscher-Ohlin family handle factor mobility. Paul Samuelson (2004) conceded that a trading partner’s productivity gains can lower a country’s welfare in some cases.
-
Outsourcing is a decision of the firm. Comparative advantage is a theory of trade between countries. Gene Grossman and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (“Trading Tasks,” American Economic Review, 2008) connect the two: as the cost of coordinating work across borders falls, firms offshore tasks one by one, and trade in tasks follows patterns that look like comparative advantage at the level of tasks.
Correction: comparative advantage holds where one country is better at everything, rests on relative cost and assumes capital stays home. Specialization on cheap labor belongs to Heckscher-Ohlin, and firms outsourcing production belongs to the theory of trade in tasks.
Further theories
- Baldwin’s unbundlings (The Great Convergence, 2016; The Globotics Upheaval, 2019). Steam separated production from consumption. Information technology split the factory across borders from about 1990. Telepresence may separate the worker from the workplace. Services reached 27.5 percent of world trade in 2025, the highest share since 2005 (WTO), which fits the third unbundling. Goods have regionalized by bloc and have not come home in volume.
- Raymond Vernon’s product life cycle (1966). New products are made near the innovating market; as they mature and standardize, production moves to low-cost sites.
- Paul Krugman’s new economic geography (1991). Increasing returns and transport costs together decide whether industry concentrates in a core or spreads. Higher trade costs favor regional dispersion of industry toward markets.
- Global value chains and the smile curve (Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon 2005; the smile curve is attributed to Stan Shih of Acer, about 1992). Value sits at the design and branding end and the distribution and service end, and assembly sits in the low-value middle. This is the NIDL in its current form.
- The Lewis turning point (Lewis 1954). Once surplus rural labor is absorbed, wages begin to rise. Zhang, Yang and Wang (2011) found “a clear rising trend of real wages rate since 2003” in China and concluded that “the era of surplus labor is over.”
- Premature deindustrialization (Rodrik 2016). Late developers reach their peak share of manufacturing earlier and at lower incomes than early industrializers did.
- The industrial commons (Pisano and Shih, Producing Prosperity, 2012). Shared local capabilities in skills, suppliers and know-how erode when manufacturing leaves, and are slow to rebuild.
- Import replacement (Jane Jacobs, The Economy of Cities, 1969; Cities and the Wealth of Nations, 1984). Cities grow by replacing imports with local production.
- Ronald Coase on the firm (1937), Yochai Benkler on commons-based peer production (2002) and Karl Polanyi’s forms of integration (1944, 1957) are treated under “Is there an evolution of production?”
- Cosmo-local production (Kostakis, Niaros, Dafermos and Bauwens 2015; Kostakis, Niaros and Giotitsas 2023): design global, manufacture local, under commons governance. It is the only theory in this register that makes a governance claim of the wiki’s kind.
Table 5.1: Theory register
The same table is available as CSV.
| theory | author_date | core_claim | steep_phase_prediction | levelling_phase_prediction | evidence | bears_on | grade | sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Least cost location | Weber 1909 | A plant leaves its transport optimum when the labor or agglomeration saving exceeds the added transport cost | The labor deviation pays over long distances | A shrinking critical isodapane pulls plants toward markets | China fully loaded labor about US$6.50/hr against Mexico US$4.90 (2024); Hormuz war risk 3.5 to 7.5% of hull (Jul 2026) | location | [MS] | Weber 1929; Tetakawi 2026; MOT 2026 |
| Substitution principle | Predöhl 1925; Isard 1956; Moses 1958 | Location is a substitution among transport and other inputs | Transport is traded for cheap labor | Capital substitutes for labor where labor is dear | 542,000 industrial robots installed in 2024, 54% in China | location | [IC] | Moses 1958; IFR 2025 |
| New international division of labor | Fröbel, Heinrichs, Kreye 1977 | Simplified manufacturing relocates to world-market factories in low-wage countries | Mass relocation of assembly | Relocation slows as preconditions weaken | GVC share of trade flat since about 52% in 2008 | location; organization | [IC] | World Bank 2020 |
| Absolute advantage | Smith 1776 | Import what others make at lower absolute cost | Trade where absolute costs differ | Mobile capital follows absolute cost | FDI to developed economies +43%, to developing -2% (2025) | location | [TBV] | Daly and Cobb 1989; UNCTAD 2026 |
| Comparative advantage | Ricardo 1817 | Specialize by relative opportunity cost, with capital immobile | Specialization deepens | Fragmentation imposes measurable losses | IMF: 0.2 to 7% of world GDP | location | [IC] | IMF SDN/2023/001 |
| Factor endowments | Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933 | Countries export goods that use their abundant factor intensively | Labor-abundant countries assemble | Assembly moves to the next labor-abundant country | US imports: China -US$135bn, 13 other Asian low-cost countries +US$193bn (2025) | location | [IC] | Kearney 2026 |
| Trade in tasks | Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008 | Falling coordination cost drives offshoring task by task | Task offshoring grows | Service tasks keep moving | Services 27.5% of world trade (2025) | organization | [IC] | WTO 2026 |
| Product life cycle | Vernon 1966 | Mature products move to low-cost sites | Mature goods offshore | New products stay near innovating markets | US greenfield announcements US$360bn, semiconductors US$137bn (2025) | location | [IC] | UNCTAD 2026 |
| New economic geography | Krugman 1991 | Increasing returns and transport costs together set concentration | Concentration in cores | Regional dispersion toward markets | Geographic distance of trade still rising about 10 km/yr | location | [MS] | MGI 2025 |
| Global value chains and smile curve | Gereffi et al. 2005; Shih c. 1992 | Value sits at the design and service ends; assembly in the middle | Assembly offshored | Assembly regionalizes; design and brand stay | Data centers about one fifth of global greenfield value (2025) | organization; governance | [IC] | UNCTAD 2026 |
| Unbundlings | Baldwin 2016, 2019 | Information technology, then telepresence, separate stages of work | The factory splits across borders | Services travel; goods regionalize | Services US$9.56tn (+8%) in 2025 | location; organization | [IC] | WTO 2026 |
| Lewis turning point | Lewis 1954 | Wages rise once surplus labor is absorbed | Flat wages in offshoring destinations | The labor deviation ends in that country | China real wages rising since 2003 | location | [IC] | Zhang et al. 2011; Cai and Du 2011 |
| Premature deindustrialization | Rodrik 2016 | Late developers peak in manufacturing earlier and poorer | Export-led path open | Path narrows | FDI to lower-income economies -5% (2025) | location | [IC] | Rodrik 2016; UNCTAD 2026 |
| Industrial commons | Pisano and Shih 2012 | Local capabilities sustain innovation and are slow to rebuild | Commons erode where plants leave | Rebuilding slows any return | US manufacturing investment about tripled since 2020; capacity +1.5% | location; governance | [MS] | Kearney 2026 |
| Import replacement | Jacobs 1969, 1984 | Cities grow by replacing imports with local production | Import dependence grows | Rewards local replacement | No aggregate measure found | location; governance | [TBV] | Jacobs 1969, 1984 |
| Theory of the firm | Coase 1937 | Firms exist where using the market costs more than internal organization | Firms span borders | Risk pulls activity into regional subsidiaries | Indirect only | organization | [IC] | Coase 1937 |
| Commons-based peer production | Benkler 2002 | A third mode of production for modular information work | Software and content | Designs travel; physical output stays small | About 3,000 fab labs (2025) | organization; governance | [MS] | Benkler 2002; Gershenfeld 2025 |
| Forms of integration | Polanyi 1944, 1957 | Reciprocity, redistribution and exchange coexist in every economy | Exchange dominates | Reciprocity and redistribution regain weight locally | Top 300 cooperatives US$2.79tn turnover (2023) | governance | [TBV] | Polanyi 1957; ICA 2025 |
| Cosmo-local production | Kostakis et al. 2015, 2023 | Design global, manufacture local, under commons governance | Not applicable | Production near need, governed in place | Case studies only | governance; location | [MS] | Kostakis et al. 2015, 2023 |
Every theory with a location prediction points toward more regional production in the levelling phase. None of them predicts a change of owner. Only the last four rows carry a governance claim, and their evidence is case studies or counts of organizations. The grade in each row is the grade of its weakest claim, which is why Weber’s row carries [MS]: its labor-cost figures come from consultancies that sell relocation to Mexico.
Production location on the steep part, about 1970 to 2008
The wiki’s World Bank series records world trade at about 25 percent of world GDP in 1970 and about 61 percent in 2008 [IC]. The World Development Report 2020 records that trade through global value chains grew fastest in the “long 1990s” and reached about 52 percent of world trade in 2008 [IC].
Transport costs did less of the work than is often assumed. David Hummels (Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2007) found that the ad valorem cost of ocean shipping was not much lower in the 2000s than in the 1950s, while the cost of air shipping fell by an order of magnitude [IC]. Hummels and Georg Schaur (American Economic Review, 2013) estimated that “each day in transit is equivalent to an ad-valorem tariff of 0.6 to 2.1 percent” [IC], which is why speed and reliability mattered as much as price. The steep part rested on:
- lower tariffs after successive trade rounds and the founding of the WTO in 1995;
- the reliability of container shipping, more than its price;
- cheap air freight for light, high-value parts;
- the collapse of the cost of coordinating work across borders.
Weber’s model has no term for the last item. Baldwin’s second unbundling supplies it: information technology let a firm run a factory in Shenzhen from Stuttgart, and that is the change the NIDL’s third precondition described in 1977.
Three series named in the commissioning brief were not retrieved and remain gaps: manufacturing wage ratios by decade for China, Mexico and Vietnam against the United States, Germany and Japan; ILO counts of export processing zones; and manufacturing FDI into developing countries from 1970 to 2008.
Production location since 2008: Weber’s three factors
Trade totals and the light and the heavy
The wiki records the trade share at about 56 percent of world GDP in 2019 [IC]. The WTO reports that world trade in goods and services grew about 4.7 percent in volume in 2025, against world GDP growth of 2.9 percent, and forecasts 2.7 percent for trade and 2.8 percent for GDP in 2026 (Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, March 2026) [IC]. In value terms, trade in goods the WTO classes as AI-enabling rose 21.9 percent in 2025 to US$4.18 trillion [IC].
Light trade is outgrowing heavy trade. Services trade reached US$9.56 trillion in 2025, up 8 percent, and digitally delivered services were 15.2 percent of world exports of goods and services (WTO, March 2026) [IC]. The WTO’s statistics page puts the services share of world trade at 27.5 percent in 2025, its highest since 2005; the same page’s summary gives 27.6 percent and states goods growth inconsistently, so the body figure is used here [IC, with the inconsistency noted]. The WTO’s April 2025 outlook put services at US$8.69 trillion in 2024, up 9 percent, against goods up 2 percent [IC].
Transport
The war that began on 28 February 2026 closed the Strait of Hormuz within days, as the wiki’s Hormuz closure snapshot records, and the strait reopened in June and closed again in July. Insurers canceled Gulf war-risk cover in early March (Al Jazeera, 3 March 2026) [IC]. In a written parliamentary reply on 4 August 2026, Singapore’s transport minister reported industry estimates that Hormuz cover had risen “to 3.5%-7.5% of hull and machinery value per transit, from 0.10%-0.25% pre-conflict,” and that Asia to North Europe container rates were “about 120%” above pre-conflict levels while remaining about 40 percent below the peak of the 2024 Red Sea disruption [IC, official record of industry estimates]. Brokers quoted in October 2026 coverage put war-risk rates at 6 to 10 percent [TBV, secondhand].
These are risk costs on particular routes. They raise the delivered cost of heavy goods that must pass a chokepoint, and they reward inventory held nearer the market. They do not raise the cost of moving a design file.
Carbon
The EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism entered its definitive phase on 1 January 2026, covering iron and steel, cement, aluminum, fertilizers, electricity and hydrogen [IC]. The European Commission set the certificate price for the first quarter of 2026 at €75.36 per tonne of CO2 equivalent (S&P Global, 7 April 2026) [IC]; a third-quarter price of €82.32 appears in the research run without a primary record [TBV]. The first surrender of certificates is due by 30 September 2027 [IC]. CBAM returns part of the sink cost that globalization left unpriced to the delivered price of heavy, carbon-intensive goods. It does so through policy, which bears on H9.
Labor
China passed its Lewis turning point in the 2000s, on the evidence of rising real wages even in slack seasons (Zhang, Yang and Wang 2011; Cai and Du 2011) [IC]. Consultancies that sell relocation to Mexico put fully loaded hourly manufacturing labor costs in 2024 at about US$6.50 to US$6.69 in China, about US$4.90 in Mexico and about US$3.00 in Vietnam [MS, interested parties drawing on national statistics].
Automation changes the labor term from the other side. The International Federation of Robotics reported 542,000 industrial robots installed worldwide in 2024, 54 percent of them in China (World Robotics 2025) [IC]. Its April 2026 release gives robot density per 10,000 manufacturing employees of 1,220 in the Republic of Korea, 449 in Germany and 307 in the United States, and 166 for China, a figure based on updated employment data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics; the IFR’s previous edition had put China at 470 for 2023, so the two editions are not comparable for China [IC].
The labor saving from moving to China has narrowed. The saving from moving to Vietnam, India or Mexico remains. The labor deviation has moved on to the next labor reserve.
Agglomeration
Kearney’s 2026 index reports that US manufacturing capital investment “has roughly tripled since COVID” while manufacturing capacity grew by about 1.5 percent, and that manufactured goods output fell by US$28 billion (0.4 percent) in 2025 [MS, consultancy]. New plants take years to reach output, and the suppliers, skills and know-how that Pisano and Shih call the industrial commons still sit in existing clusters, most of them in East Asia. Agglomeration continues to favor existing clusters.
What Weber predicts at present costs
- Heavy goods that are time-sensitive, pass chokepoints or carry a carbon price move toward their markets and materials.
- Light, high-value goods keep long supply chains, because transport is a small share of their delivered cost.
- Labor-intensive assembly moves to the next low-wage reserve that lies inside the shrunken critical isodapane, which for the US market includes Mexico and for Europe includes North Africa and Eastern Europe.
- Existing clusters hold, because the agglomeration deviation still favors them.
- The model says nothing about owners.
That is a prediction of regionalization. Weber supplies a mechanism for production moving toward markets, and no mechanism for a change of owner.
Policy, reported separately
Governments adopted measures whose stated aims include moving production: US tariffs from 2018 and the wider tariffs of 2025; the US CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act (both 2022); China’s dual circulation strategy (2020); India’s production-linked incentive schemes (from 2020); and the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (2024). This brief reports stated aims and measured outcomes only.
Measured outcomes for 2025, from UNCTAD’s Global Investment Trends Monitor No. 50 (January 2026) [IC]:
- Greenfield project announcements in the United States reached an estimated US$360 billion, “particularly semiconductors ($137 billion) and data centres ($38 billion).”
- FDI inflows to India “surged by 73% to $47 billion, mainly due to large investments in services,” with manufacturing also named.
- FDI to developed economies rose 43 percent to US$728 billion; flows to developing economies fell 2 percent to an estimated US$877 billion.
- Supply-chain-intensive manufacturing projects announced in high-income economies fell 28 percent.
- Manufacturing projects announced in middle-income economies fell 22 percent in number and 45 percent in value.
Announcements against relocations
The Reshoring Initiative, an advocacy group, reported that “244,000 U.S. manufacturing jobs were announced in 2024 via reshoring and foreign direct investment,” 88 percent of them in high or medium-high technology sectors (2024 Annual Report, 9 June 2025) [MS, advocacy group counting announcements]. Kearney’s index measures what happened in trade. Its 2025 edition reported a fall of 311 points for 2024. In the 2026 edition the index improved from minus 115 to minus 86 in the report (minus 91 in the press release of 29 April 2026), still negative, and the ratio of Asian manufactured imports to US manufacturing output rose from 13.29 percent to 14.15 percent [MS, consultancy that sells reshoring advice]. Announcements outrun relocations.
The evidence shows new capacity in a narrow set of strategic sectors, and the expansion of existing plants in neighboring countries. It does not show existing capacity being dismantled in Asia and moved.
Distributed production
Neil Gershenfeld, who founded the fab lab network, counted about 3,000 fab labs in some 150 countries in February 2025 [MS]. No aggregate measure of output was found for additive manufacturing, microfactories or open hardware. All are small against world manufacturing.
Table 5.2: Production-location indicators
The same table is available as CSV.
| indicator | weber_factor | 1980 | 1995 | 2008 | 2019 | latest | direction | grade | sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| World trade share of GDP | none | about 61% | about 56% | mixed | [IC] | World Bank | |||
| GVC share of world trade | none | about 52% | about half | mixed | [IC] | World Bank WDR 2020 | |||
| Services share of world trade | none | 27.5% (2025) | supports continued globalization | [IC] | WTO | ||||
| Services trade value | none | US$8.69tn (2024); US$9.56tn (2025) | supports continued globalization | [IC] | WTO | ||||
| Trade volume growth against GDP growth | none | 4.7% against 2.9% (2025) | supports continued globalization | [IC] | WTO GTOS Mar 2026 | ||||
| Asia to North Europe container rate | transport | about +120% on pre-conflict (Jul 2026) | supports glocalization | [IC] | Singapore MOT | ||||
| Hormuz war-risk premium | transport | 0.10-0.25% of hull pre-conflict; 3.5-7.5% (Jul 2026) | supports fragmentation into blocs | [IC] | Singapore MOT | ||||
| CBAM certificate price | none | €75.36/tCO2e (Q1 2026) | supports glocalization | [IC] | European Commission via S&P Global | ||||
| China manufacturing labor cost | labor | about US$6.50-6.69/hr (2024) | supports fragmentation into blocs | [MS] | Tetakawi | ||||
| Mexico manufacturing labor cost | labor | about US$4.90/hr (2024) | supports fragmentation into blocs | [MS] | Tetakawi | ||||
| Robot density, Republic of Korea | labor | 1,220 per 10,000 (2024) | mixed | [IC] | IFR | ||||
| Robot density, China | labor | 166 per 10,000 (2024, new denominator) | mixed | [IC] | IFR | ||||
| Greenfield manufacturing projects, middle-income economies | none | number -22%, value -45% (2025) | supports fragmentation into blocs | [IC] | UNCTAD GITM 50 | ||||
| FDI to developed and developing economies | none | +43% and -2% (2025) | supports fragmentation into blocs | [IC] | UNCTAD GITM 50 | ||||
| FDI to Mexico | none | US$44bn, +16% (2025) | supports fragmentation into blocs | [IC] | UNCTAD GITM 50 | ||||
| Kearney Reshoring Index (US) | none | -115 (2024); -86 (2025) | supports fragmentation into blocs | [MS] | Kearney 2026 | ||||
| Geopolitical distance of trade | none | about 3.5 (early 2010s) | 3.1 (2023) | supports fragmentation into blocs | [MS] | MGI 2025 | |||
| Geographic distance of trade | transport | about 5,200 km, rising about 10 km/yr | supports continued globalization | [MS] | MGI 2025 | ||||
| German renewable capacity owned by citizens and farmers | none | 40.4% | 40.4% (2019; 42% in 2016) | mixed | [IC] | trend:research for AEE | |||
| Turnover of the 300 largest cooperatives | none | US$2.79tn (2023) | mixed | [MS] | ICA 2025 |
The transport and carbon rows point toward glocalization in its location sense. The investment and trade-geometry rows point toward blocs. The services rows point toward continued globalization of light trade. The blank cells for 1980 and 1995 are real gaps in what this run retrieved; the steep part is described in prose from the series that were found. MGI’s distance measures are MGI’s own constructions and are graded [MS] for that reason; its 2026 update reports a further 1.2 percent fall in geopolitical distance in 2025 and a further rise in geographic distance.
Location and governance
Relocated production is owned by the same multinational firms or by their domestic peers. Three records show it:
- UNCTAD attributes a significant share of Mexico’s 2025 FDI rise to reinvested earnings, the profits of firms already operating there [IC].
- US greenfield investment in 2025 concentrated in semiconductors and data centers, sectors with few owners; UNCTAD puts data centers at about one fifth of global greenfield project value [IC].
- Kearney shows US imports moving from China to other Asian low-cost countries, with the same buyers at the head of the chain [MS].
Design, research and branding stay in high-wage centers, with one qualification: UNCTAD names finance, IT and R&D among the services driving India’s FDI inflow in 2025, so some high-value work is moving to large middle-income economies. The smile curve persists with its ends redistributed among large economies, and the place of assembly shifted within it.
Production governed in place exists, at these scales:
- Cooperatives. The International Cooperative Alliance’s World Cooperative Monitor (released 3 November 2025) reports that “the Top 300 cooperatives achieved a combined turnover of USD 2.79 trillion in 2023” [MS, the sector’s own federation]. Most of that turnover is in insurance, agriculture and retail, and much of it predates 2008.
- Mondragon, the Basque cooperative group, reports more than 71,400 workers and €11.3 billion in sales for 2025 [MS, own report] (see Federated Cooperative Supply Chains).
- Citizen energy in Germany. A study by trend:research for the Agentur für Erneuerbare Energien (released 15 January 2021) found that individuals and farmers owned 40.4 percent of German renewable capacity in 2019, down from 42 percent in 2016, and about a quarter of the capacity added in 2019 [IC].
No series found for this brief shows relocated manufacturing passing to place-based owners. The one measured trend in place-based ownership is downward. The evidence supports the corporate sense of glocalization and regionalization under existing owners. It does not yet support the wiki’s sense.
Is there an evolution of production?
TIME has five properties on the wiki: four forms in sequence; each solved problems the prior forms could not; each externalized costs (negative externalities) onto the substrate the next form must organize; each is tied to a communications revolution (Ronfeldt); and all four operate together now. The question is whether any sequence of production forms in the literature has the same properties.
- Marx’s sequence of handicraft, manufacture and machinofacture (Capital, volume 1, 1867) is a sequence of labor processes tied to technology. It treats the later form as displacing the earlier and makes no claim that all forms coexist.
- The regulation school’s Fordism and post-Fordism (Aglietta 1976) has two terms. Its account of crisis covers costs pushed onto workers and the state, which is close to the externalization property.
- The organizational sequence of household, workshop and guild, factory, national corporation and global value chain has the coexistence property: every one of these forms operates today. Alfred Chandler (The Visible Hand, 1977) ties the national corporation to the railroad and the telegraph, and Baldwin ties the value chain to the internet, which gives two of the forms a communications revolution.
- Polanyi’s forms of integration map reciprocity onto the Tribal form, redistribution onto the Institutional form and exchange onto the Market form, with no fourth. Polanyi’s householding has no counterpart.
- Coase’s firm and market, with Benkler’s peer production as a third mode, map onto the Institutional, Market and Emergent forms, with no Tribal term. Benkler ties peer production to networked information, which supplies the communications revolution for the Emergent form.
- Michael’s Farmer, Forger, Founder, Framer sequence of entrepreneurship lines up loosely with the workshop, factory and corporation stages. It is used here as a comparison only.
No sequence found has all five properties. None states the externalization property in TIME’s form, in which each form pushes costs onto a substrate the next must organize. On the organizational sequence, glocalization would sit after the global value chain, with cosmo-local production as its rule.
A candidate sequence that would carry TIME’s properties is set out here as a proposal for Michael, and as his construct (TIME is Ronfeldt’s TIMN renamed; any companion sequence is Michael’s, never Ronfeldt’s):
| TIME form | Production form | Communications tie | Cost externalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tribal | Household and kin production | Speech and shared practice | To be tested |
| Institutional | Workshop, guild and chartered corporation | Writing and print | To be tested |
| Market | Market factory and global value chain | Telegraph, then the internet | Labor, communities and sinks (recorded on the TIME page) |
| Emergent | Peer and cosmo-local production | Networked information | To be tested |
Glocalization, on this proposal, is the stage in which the Emergent form governs place-based production while drawing on the Institutional and Market forms. A further research run tested the proposal. The Evolution of Production amends the sequence as follows, finds that every form externalized costs, the Emergent form included, and finds no evidence that each later form arose to organize its predecessor’s costs:
| TIME form | Production form | Communications tie | Cost externalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tribal | Household and kin production (foraging band, then farming household) | Speech and shared practice | Unpaid household labor, mostly women’s; under farming, soil and the commons cleared for fields |
| Institutional | Privileged production: temple and palace estates, craft guilds, chartered companies | Writing for records and charters, then print | Rents paid by consumers and excluded workers (guilds); colonized labor and land (chartered companies) |
| Market | Factory, managerial corporation and global value chain | Power and transport for the factory; telegraph for the corporation; internet for the value chain | Labor, communities and sinks |
| Emergent | Commons-based peer production and cosmo-local production | Networked information on cheap computation | Unpaid maintainer labor; energy and water through infrastructure it does not govern |
The glocalization claim, that the Emergent form governs place-based production, remains a speculative projection. The production nodes and the record of who took up each form’s costs are on The Sequence and the Debt.
Hypotheses
H1. The analogy holds
- For: the organizational forms of production coexist today; Polanyi’s and the Coase-Benkler sequences each map onto three of TIME’s four forms.
- Against: no sequence in the literature has all five of TIME’s properties; the governance evidence for the Emergent form is small.
- Grade [TBV]. Recommended status: speculative-projection.
- A practitioner can conclude: use glocalization as the name of a stage the wiki is working toward, and present any production sequence as Michael’s proposal.
H2. Weber fit the steep part
- For: from 1980 to 2008, assembly moved to distant low-wage sites while transport costs stayed material, the pattern of the labor deviation.
- Against: ocean freight costs barely fell (Hummels 2007); falling tariffs and coordination costs did much of the work, and Weber’s model has no term for coordination.
- Grade [IC]. Recommended status: academic-inference.
- A practitioner can conclude: the labor deviation describes the steep part once coordination cost is added to the model.
H3. The substitution reverses
- For: China’s labor advantage narrowed; war-risk premiums on Hormuz transits rose more than tenfold in 2026; CBAM prices carbon in heavy imports to the EU.
- Against: US imports from Asian low-cost countries rose in 2024 and 2025; the geographic distance of trade keeps rising; the labor deviation has moved on to Vietnam, India and Mexico.
- Grade [MS]. Recommended status: working-hypothesis.
- A practitioner can conclude: heavy, carbon-intensive goods that pass chokepoints are moving toward markets; assembly is moving to the next low-wage country.
H4. The NIDL’s preconditions are weakening
- For: China’s labor reserve is absorbed; transport through chokepoints costs more and is less reliable.
- Against: labor reserves remain large in South Asia and Africa; production keeps being broken into simpler tasks; communications keep improving, which strengthens the third precondition.
- Grade: [IC] for the weakening of the first precondition in China; [TBV] for the other two. Recommended status: academic-inference for China, working-hypothesis overall.
- A practitioner can conclude: one precondition weakened, in one country; the NIDL persists in regional form, and H4 as stated (two of three weakened) is not supported.
H5. The division of labor reorganizes and persists
- For: reinvested earnings in Mexico; the China plus one shift under the same buyers; strategic greenfield investment in sectors with few owners.
- Against: India’s 2025 FDI included finance, IT and R&D services, so some high-value work moved.
- Grade [IC]. Recommended status: academic-inference.
- A practitioner can conclude: relocated production is governed from the same centers. The evidence supports the corporate sense of glocalization and regionalization.
H6. Comparative advantage changes its basis
- For: carbon and energy now enter the delivered price of some heavy goods; skills and energy decide where automated plants go.
- Against: no study found measures a shift of comparative advantage toward water or ecological capacity.
- Grade [TBV]. Recommended status: working-hypothesis.
- A practitioner can conclude: cheap clean energy may give a bioregion an edge in heavy, energy-intensive goods. So far that is argument, without measurement.
H7. Light travels, heavy settles
- For: services trade grew 9 percent in 2024 and 8 percent in 2025 and reached 27.5 percent of world trade, its highest share since 2005.
- Against: AI hardware lifted goods trade in 2025; heavy goods are settling into blocs far larger than any bioregion.
- Grade: [IC] for the services half; [MS] for the heavy half. Recommended status: documented-fact for the services half, working-hypothesis for the heavy half.
- A practitioner can conclude: trade in knowledge and services is outgrowing trade in goods.
H8. Agglomeration returns at the regional scale
- For: the industrial commons literature and new economic geography both find production gains from clusters.
- Against: those gains now favor existing clusters; US capacity grew 1.5 percent while investment roughly tripled.
- Grade [MS]. Recommended status: academic-inference for the mechanism; speculative-projection for the bioregional scale.
- A practitioner can conclude: a bioregional cluster has to rebuild an industrial commons before it can expect cluster gains.
H9. The drivers are structural
The test against the deceleration indicators the wiki tracks:
-
Falling final-stage EROI should appear as a rising energy cost of moving heavy goods. The 2026 rise in freight and insurance costs came from a war that closed a strait, a supply interruption, so this record cannot separate a structural energy signal from a geopolitical one.
-
Transgressed planetary boundaries appear in location decisions most clearly through CBAM, which is a policy instrument. The sink cost reaches location through policy.
-
Rising debt ratios: no evidence linking them to location decisions was found.
-
The wage-productivity gap: no study was found linking it to location decisions; any link through support for tariffs would be political.
-
For: Chinese wages rose from 2003, before the tariffs; war-risk and carbon costs apply to a cargo whatever its owner’s political alignment.
-
Against: geopolitical distance of trade falls while geographic distance rises; the 2025 shift followed tariffs, and 75 percent of Kearney’s March 2026 respondents switched country of origin away from China to other low-cost countries.
-
Grade [TBV]. Recommended status: working-hypothesis. The geopolitical rival is better supported for 2018 to 2026.
-
A practitioner can conclude: present regionalization is mostly bloc politics. Structural pressure reaches location decisions mainly through prices set by shocks and by policy.
H10. Governance is moving to place
- For: the 300 largest cooperatives turned over US$2.79 trillion in 2023; Mondragon employs more than 71,400 people; there are about 3,000 fab labs; citizens and farmers owned 40.4 percent of German renewable capacity in 2019.
- Against: the German share is falling; no series shows relocated production passing to place-based owners; much cooperative scale predates 2008.
- Grade: [IC] and [MS] for the counts; [TBV] for any trend. Recommended status: documented-fact for the counts; speculative-projection for the trend.
- A practitioner can conclude: production governed in place is a large minority form that sits outside the main flow of relocation.
Evidence the framing must face
- Globalization may not be levelling. World trade grew faster than world GDP in 2025, and services reached their highest share of trade since 2005 (WTO). MGI’s 2026 update found that “trade in 2025 did not retrench, despite dire predictions,” with AI hardware shipments up almost 40 percent and accounting for about a third of trade growth. The World Development Report 2020 attributes part of the post-2008 fall in trade intensity to China building its own supply chains, which lowers China’s reliance on imported inputs without any change in the logic of the global economy. On this reading 2008 marks a change in what is traded more than a levelling of trade.
- Reshoring may be mostly talk. Kearney’s index of realized imports stayed negative in 2024 and 2025 while job announcements tracked by the Reshoring Initiative ran into the hundreds of thousands. Announcements outrun relocations.
- Automation may concentrate production. China installed 54 percent of the world’s new industrial robots in 2024 (IFR). If robots make labor cost irrelevant, production may cluster in a few highly automated sites near capital and skills, and the existing largest cluster is in China. That is a different outcome from place-based production.
- Comparative advantage still applies. The IMF estimates the long-run cost of trade fragmentation at 0.2 to 7 percent of world GDP, rising to 8 to 12 percent in some countries if technology also decouples (Aiyar and others, SDN/2023/001). A scenario of two trading blocs costs about 2.3 percent of world GDP (Bolhuis, Chen and Kett 2023). Relocalizing production that a place does badly makes it poorer, on these estimates.
- The developing-country view. FDI to lower-income economies fell 5 percent in 2025 (UNCTAD), and manufacturing greenfield projects in middle-income economies fell sharply. Rodrik’s work shows the export-led path to industrialization was already narrowing before 2008. A levelling that closes it further harms countries that have not yet industrialized. The wiki’s caveat on Ha-Joon Chang applies: his case for protecting infant industries in poor countries is a different argument from relocalizing production in rich ones, and the two should not be cited for each other.
- The word. The Oxford Dictionary of New Words (Tulloch 1991, p. 134), quoted by Robertson (1995, p. 28), says glocalization was “formed by telescoping global and local to make a blend,” modeled on the Japanese dochakuka (from dochaku, “living on one’s own land”), originally the agricultural principle of adapting farming technique to local conditions and later taken into Japanese business. Most readers meet the corporate sense first. Swyngedouw (1997, 2004) used the word for a rescaling of governance, the nearest academic precedent for the wiki’s sense.
Summary table
| Claim | Grade | Recommended status | Safe to state publicly |
|---|---|---|---|
| The share of world trade through global value chains reached about 52% in 2008 and has not grown since | [IC] | documented-fact | yes |
| China passed its Lewis turning point in the 2000s | [IC] | academic-inference | yes |
| War-risk premiums for Hormuz transits rose from 0.10-0.25% to 3.5-7.5% of hull value by July 2026 | [IC] | documented-fact | yes |
| Services reached 27.5% of world trade in 2025, the highest since 2005 | [IC] | documented-fact | with caveat (WTO page gives two figures) |
| US reshoring was net negative on realized imports in 2024 and 2025 | [MS] | documented-fact | with caveat (consultancy index) |
| Trade is realigning by political bloc more than by distance | [MS] | academic-inference | with caveat (MGI’s own measure) |
| Weber’s labor deviation describes 1980 to 2008 relocation once coordination cost is added | [IC] | academic-inference | yes |
| Least-cost location has moved toward markets for heavy, carbon-priced goods that pass chokepoints | [MS] | working-hypothesis | with caveat |
| Relocated production is governed from the same centers | [IC] | academic-inference | yes |
| Governance of production is moving to place | [TBV] | speculative-projection | no |
| Production evolved through forms with TIME’s properties | [TBV] | speculative-projection | no |
| Glocalization is the latest stage in the evolution of production | [TBV] | working-hypothesis | with caveat |
| The word glocalization is modeled on Japanese dochakuka | [IC] | documented-fact | yes |
Related
- Glocalization
- Globalization
- Cosmo-Local Production
- Retention Logic
- Deceleration Indicators
- Bioregional Economics
- Federated Cooperative Supply Chains
- The S-Curve Thesis
- The S-Curve Research Brief
- The TIME Framework
- Evolution of Coordination Nodes
- The Evolution of Production
- The Sequence and the Debt
- Cycle of Globalization
- The Three Lineages
- Farmer, Forger, Founder, Framer
- Disruption Snapshot: The Hormuz Closure
- Comparative Advantage (glossary)
Sources
Theories of location and trade:
- Weber, A. (1929). Theory of the Location of Industries. Trans. C. J. Friedrich. University of Chicago Press. (Original 1909.)
- Predöhl, A. (1928). “The Theory of Location in Its Relation to General Economics”. Journal of Political Economy, 36(3), 371–390. https://doi.org/10.1086/253962
- Isard, W. (1956). Location and Space-Economy. MIT Press and Wiley.
- Moses, L. N. (1958). “Location and the Theory of Production”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 72(2), 259–272. https://doi.org/10.2307/1880599
- Hoover, E. M. (1948). The Location of Economic Activity. McGraw-Hill.
- Lösch, A. (1954). The Economics of Location. Yale University Press. (Original 1940.)
- Fröbel, F., Heinrichs, J., & Kreye, O. (1980). The New International Division of Labour. Cambridge University Press. https://assets.cambridge.org/97805212/87203/frontmatter/9780521287203_frontmatter.pdf
- Starosta, G. (2016). “Revisiting the New International Division of Labour Thesis”. In G. Charnock & G. Starosta (eds.), The New International Division of Labour. Palgrave Macmillan. https://cicpint.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Starosta_Revisiting-NIDL-thesis.pdf
- Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.
- Ricardo, D. (1817). On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. John Murray. https://www.econlib.org/library/Ricardo/ricP.html
- Heckscher, E. F. (1919). “The Effect of Foreign Trade on the Distribution of Income”. Ekonomisk Tidskrift, 21, 497–512.
- Ohlin, B. (1933). Interregional and International Trade. Harvard University Press.
- Stolper, W. F., & Samuelson, P. A. (1941). “Protection and Real Wages”. Review of Economic Studies, 9(1), 58–73. https://doi.org/10.2307/2967638
- Samuelson, P. A. (2004). “Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm Arguments of Mainstream Economists Supporting Globalization”. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(3), 135–146. https://doi.org/10.1257/0895330042162403
- Daly, H. E., & Cobb, J. B. (1989). For the Common Good. Beacon Press.
- Grossman, G. M., & Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2008). “Trading Tasks: A Simple Theory of Offshoring”. American Economic Review, 98(5), 1978–1997. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.5.1978
- Baldwin, R. (2016). The Great Convergence. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Baldwin, R. (2019). The Globotics Upheaval. Oxford University Press.
- Vernon, R. (1966). “International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80(2), 190–207. https://doi.org/10.2307/1880689
- Krugman, P. (1991). “Increasing Returns and Economic Geography”. Journal of Political Economy, 99(3), 483–499. https://doi.org/10.1086/261763
- Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J., & Sturgeon, T. (2005). “The Governance of Global Value Chains”. Review of International Political Economy, 12(1), 78–104. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290500049805
- Lewis, W. A. (1954). “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour”. The Manchester School, 22(2), 139–191. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.1954.tb00021.x
- Zhang, X., Yang, J., & Wang, S. (2011). “China Has Reached the Lewis Turning Point”. China Economic Review, 22(4), 542–554. https://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeechieco/v_3a22_3ay_3a2011_3ai_3a4_3ap_3a542-554.htm
- Cai, F., & Du, Y. (2011). “Wage Increases, Wage Convergence, and the Lewis Turning Point in China”. China Economic Review, 22(4), 601–610. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1043951X11000605
- Rodrik, D. (2016). “Premature Deindustrialization”. Journal of Economic Growth, 21(1), 1–33. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10887-015-9122-3
- Pisano, G. P., & Shih, W. C. (2012). Producing Prosperity. Harvard Business Review Press.
- Jacobs, J. (1969). The Economy of Cities. Random House.
- Jacobs, J. (1984). Cities and the Wealth of Nations. Random House.
- Coase, R. H. (1937). “The Nature of the Firm”. Economica, 4(16), 386–405. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x
- Benkler, Y. (2002). “Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm”. Yale Law Journal, 112(3), 369–446. https://doi.org/10.2307/1562247
- Polanyi, K. (1944). The Great Transformation. Farrar & Rinehart.
- Polanyi, K. (1957). “The Economy as Instituted Process”. In K. Polanyi, C. Arensberg & H. Pearson (eds.), Trade and Market in the Early Empires. Free Press.
- Kostakis, V., Niaros, V., Dafermos, G., & Bauwens, M. (2015). “Design Global, Manufacture Local”. Futures, 73, 126–135.
- Kostakis, V., Niaros, V., & Giotitsas, C. (2023). “Beyond Global Versus Local”. Sustainability Science. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11625-023-01378-1
- Marx, K. (1867). Capital, Volume I.
- Aglietta, M. (1979). A Theory of Capitalist Regulation. New Left Books. (Original 1976.)
- Chandler, A. D. (1977). The Visible Hand. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The word:
- Tulloch, S. (comp.) (1991). The Oxford Dictionary of New Words. Oxford University Press.
- Robertson, R. (1995). “Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity”. In Global Modernities. SAGE.
- Swyngedouw, E. (1997). “Neither Global nor Local: ‘Glocalization’ and the Politics of Scale”. In K. Cox (ed.), Spaces of Globalization. Guilford Press.
- Swyngedouw, E. (2004). “Globalisation or ‘Glocalisation’? Networks, Territories and Rescaling”. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17(1), 25–48.
Official statistics and agency research:
- World Bank. Trade (% of GDP), World. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS?locations=1W
- World Bank (2020). World Development Report 2020: Trading for Development in the Age of Global Value Chains. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/310211570690546749/pdf/World-Development-Report-2020-Trading-for-Development-in-the-Age-of-Global-Value-Chains.pdf
- Hummels, D. (2007). “Transportation Costs and International Trade in the Second Era of Globalization”. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(3), 131–154. https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/jecper/v21y2007i3p131-154.html
- Hummels, D., & Schaur, G. (2013). “Time as a Trade Barrier”. American Economic Review, 103(7), 2935–2959. https://business.purdue.edu/faculty/hummelsd/papers/time%20as%20a%20trade%20barrier%20final.pdf
- WTO (2026, March). Global Trade Outlook and Statistics. https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gtos0326_e.pdf
- WTO. World Trade Statistics. https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/world_trade_statistics_e.htm
- UNCTAD (2026, January). Global Investment Trends Monitor No. 50. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/diaeiainf2026d1_en.pdf
- International Federation of Robotics (2026, 8 April). “Robot Density Surges in Europe, Asia and Americas”. https://ifr.org/ifr-press-releases/news/robot-density-surges-in-europe-asia-and-americas
- Singapore Ministry of Transport (2026, 4 August). Written reply on war-risk insurance premiums, marine insurance costs and freight rates. https://www.mot.gov.sg/news-resources/newsroom/increases-in-war-risk-insurance-premiums—marine-insurance-costs-and-freight-rates-due-to-us-iran-conflict/
- Aiyar, S., and others (2023). *Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism*. IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/2023/001. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/006/2023/001/article-A001-en.xml
- Bolhuis, M., Chen, J., & Kett, B. (2023, June). “The Costs of Geoeconomic Fragmentation”. Finance & Development. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fandd/issues/2023/06/the-costs-of-geoeconomic-fragmentation-bolhuis-chen-kett
Industry, sector and consultancy reports (interested parties labeled on each source page):
- Kearney (2026). *2026 Reshoring Index*. https://www.kearney.com/documents/d/asset-library-291362522/2026-reshoring-index-1
- Reshoring Initiative (2025, 9 June). *2024 Annual Report*. https://reshorenow.org/june-9-2025/
- McKinsey Global Institute (2025, 27 January). “Geopolitics and the Geometry of Global Trade: 2025 Update”. https://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/our-research/geopolitics-and-the-geometry-of-global-trade-2025-update
- McKinsey Global Institute (2026, 19 March). “Geopolitics and the Geometry of Global Trade: 2026 Update”. https://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/our-research/geopolitics-and-the-geometry-of-global-trade-2026-update
- Tetakawi (2026). “Manufacturing Wages: Mexico vs China”. https://insights.tetakawi.com/manufacturing-wages-mexico-vs-china
- International Cooperative Alliance (2025, 3 November). *World Cooperative Monitor 2025* (press release). https://ica.coop/sites/default/files/2025-11/pr_world_cooperative_monitor_en.pdf
- Mondragon Corporation. Annual reports. https://www.mondragon-corporation.com/people/en/anual-report/letters-for-the-president/
- Agentur für Erneuerbare Energien (2021, 15 January). “Studie: Bürgerenergie bleibt zentrale Säule der Energiewende”. https://www.unendlich-viel-energie.de/studie-buergerenergie-bleibt-zentrale-saeule-der-energiewende
- Gershenfeld, N. (2025, February). “The Band Began to Play: The History and Future of Fab Labs”. Make:. https://makezine.com/article/uncategorized/the-band-began-to-play-the-history-and-future-of-fab-labs/
Journalism:
- Al Jazeera (2026, 3 March). “Maritime insurers cancel war risk cover in Gulf”. https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/3/3/maritime-insurers-cancel-war-risk-cover-in-gulf-will-it-spike-energy-cost
- S&P Global (2026, 7 April). “Brussels confirms first CBAM certificate price for Q1 2026”. https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/energy-transition/040726-brussels-confirms-first-cbam-certificate-price-for-q1-2026-at-eur7536mtco2e
Provenance
Written 8 November 2026 from a Claude deep research run under version 0.1 of glocalization-evolution-of-production-deep-research.md in the BioConomy project, then checked and drafted into the wiki’s format by Claude with file access to the site. The research run could not fetch the wiki’s own pages. While this page was drafted, the Globalization, Glocalization, Deceleration Indicators and TIME Framework pages and the Hormuz closure snapshot were read from the site’s files, and H9 was tested against the deceleration indicators as they stand on the site.
Figures checked against their sources while drafting, with the corrections made: Kearney’s press release of 29 April 2026 gives the index as minus 91 and the gain to other Asian low-cost countries as US$193 billion, where the run’s report gave minus 86 and US$194 billion; the page gives both index values and US$193 billion. The WTO statistics page states the 2025 services share as 27.5 percent in its body and 27.6 percent in its summary, and states goods growth two ways; the body figure is used. The Singapore Ministry of Transport figures come from a written reply dated 4 August 2026, reporting industry estimates as of July. The IFR release does not itself call China’s 166 a revision; it says China’s figure rests on updated employment data, and the comparison with the previous edition’s 470 is the brief’s. MGI’s 2026 update gives AI hardware shipments as up almost 40 percent, where the run’s report described all AI-related trade. UNCTAD’s text describes data centers as one fifth of global greenfield value in one place and more than one fifth in another. A South-South trade figure in the run’s report was not found in the WTO source and was dropped, as was a 2012 figure for German citizen energy.
Not read in the original: Weber, Predöhl, Isard and Fröbel and colleagues were read through secondary literature and publisher front matter, so their positions are paraphrased and no verbatim quotation from them is given. Ricardo’s chapter 7 passage is quoted from the standard text. The Moses and Daly quotations in the run’s report were not verified and are paraphrased.
Editorial decisions. The working title was extended with the run’s finding, “Regionalization Under Existing Owners.” epistemic_status is working-hypothesis because the page’s organizing claim is the amended statement under test; most of its trade and investment figures are documented facts from official sources. Labor-cost figures from consultancies that sell relocation to Mexico, Kearney’s index and the Reshoring Initiative’s counts are graded [MS] as interested parties. MGI’s distance measures are graded [MS] as one firm’s construction. The ILO export processing zone counts, wage ratios by decade and 1970 to 2008 FDI series were not retrieved and are left as gaps. The candidate production sequence is Michael’s construct for testing, never Ronfeldt’s. Glossary links to the thirteen terms created from the hand-back were added the same day. Place-specific material (nearshoring to Mexico as a national case, German citizen energy, and the absence of South African material on the automotive sector and on the Valley of Grace) is kept to brief examples here and named for the BioHubs directory and the DevForum (Ward 2 Development Forum) register.
On 8 November 2026 the closing sentence of “Is there an evolution of production?” was replaced with the amended sequence and a pointer to The Evolution of Production, the follow-up run it called for.