Globalization is the economic form of the acceleration phase of the industrial S-curve: the joining of national economies into one planetary system of trade, capital flow and production, organized to move goods, money, people and information across the largest surface available.

Overview

This page is the corollary of Glocalization. The wiki treats the two as distinct economic forms, each suited to a phase of the curve. Globalization belongs to the steep part, when energy was cheap, ecological sinks were open and returns to scale compounded. Under those conditions long supply chains and mobile capital were the lowest-cost way to organize production, and the economies that joined the system grew.

Globalization built things every place now uses: a planetary communications network, a shared scientific enterprise, common technical standards, capital markets that work across borders and the habit of cooperating with distant partners. It also drew value out of places and concentrated the gains. It ran down the ecological sinks it treated as free. The global economy it produced remains the outermost layer of the Economy.

As the curve flattens, the conditions that made globalization fit weaken one at a time (see Deceleration Indicators). The wiki’s reading is that globalization’s useful inheritance passes into glocalization, and that its operating logic belongs to the phase that produced it.

Why it fit the acceleration phase

The S-Curve Thesis identifies the coordination substrate of the acceleration phase as debt-based money with positive interest, which needs growth for its own repayment. That substrate makes throughput the cheapest available behavior. Globalization carried throughput past national borders. When a domestic market slowed, capital could find growth in another one, and the Two Machines of debt-based money and the shareholder corporation kept their requirement for expansion satisfied.

The physical conditions matched. High energy return on investment made it cheap to move heavy goods across oceans. The atmosphere and the rivers absorbed waste without a price. Production could concentrate wherever labor and land cost least, and the savings outweighed the cost of shipping. Alfred Weber described that calculation in 1909 as the labor deviation: a plant leaves its transport-optimal site when the labor saving exceeds the added transport cost (see Glocalization and the Evolution of Production). The theory came earlier: David Ricardo’s comparative advantage, set out in 1817, gave the case for specialization and trade that later free-trade doctrine relied on.

Phases of globalization

Globalization did not grow in a straight line. Historians usually describe a first wave from about 1870 to 1914, carried by steamships and the telegraph under the gold standard, which the First World War and the Depression broke apart. After 1944 the Bretton Woods system rebuilt trade under managed exchange rates and controls on capital movement, which left national governments considerable room to direct their own economies.

From the 1980s the form changed. Capital controls were lifted, the World Trade Organization was founded in 1995 and China joined it in 2001 [IC]. Container shipping and digital communications cut the cost of coordinating production across continents. Some economists call this period hyperglobalization. World trade rose from about 25 percent of world GDP in 1970 to about 61 percent in 2008 [IC].

After the 2008 financial crisis the ratio fell, and in 2019 it stood at about 56 percent, below its 2008 level [IC] (World Bank data). The share of world trade passing through global value chains reached about 52 percent in 2008 and has not grown since [IC] (World Bank, World Development Report 2020). Since 2017 the average geopolitical distance of trade has fallen about 7 percent while its average geographic distance has kept rising, by McKinsey Global Institute’s measures [MS], so trade is regrouping by political alignment more than by proximity. The slowdown is sometimes called “slowbalization”. The pandemic of 2020 and the six-day blockage of the Suez Canal in 2021 showed how exposed long supply chains are to a single point of failure. The Cycle of Globalization places these phases inside a longer seven-phase model of the first globalized civilization, dated from 1648. Governments across the political range have since adopted reshoring and industrial policy, which The BioConomy Developmental Arc reads as structural adaptation to deceleration. The wiki’s evidence brief on production location finds that policy explains most of the measured shift since 2018, laid over an older structural rise in Chinese wages, and that relocated production has stayed under its existing owners.

What it left behind

The inheritance

The Glocalization page lists what a place-based economy keeps from globalization: shared knowledge and open science, communications infrastructure, common standards and protocols, planetary observation, cross-border finance directed to place outcomes, and cooperation across distance. None of these would exist at their present scale without the global economy that paid for them.

The costs

Globalization moved value out of places. Production concentrated where costs were lowest, and the surplus flowed to owners of capital and intellectual property elsewhere. Places supplying raw materials or cheap labor kept little of what their land and people produced, the pattern retention logic is built to reverse.

It ran down the sinks it treated as free. Six of the nine planetary boundaries are now transgressed (see Deceleration Indicators), and much of the load was carried by places far from the consumers of the goods.

Its gains concentrated. Output grew, and in several countries poverty fell sharply, but the countries that gained most from integration (South Korea and later China among them) joined the system on their own terms, behind the protections that Ha-Joon Chang documents in Kicking Away the Ladder. Countries that opened fully on the terms offered fared less well. Within rich economies, wages drew away from productivity.

It made places fragile. Efficiency removed redundancy, and a place that imports its food, fuel, medicine and spare parts depends on every link in chains it does not govern.

Karl Polanyi described the earlier wave’s collapse in The Great Transformation (1944): a market economy disembedded from society provokes a protective counter-movement (the double movement), and the form the counter-movement takes decides what follows. The wiki reads the present moment in similar terms. Glocalization is one form the counter-movement can take, and its distinguishing mark is that it keeps the inheritance.

Globalization and glocalization

The comparison table on the Glocalization page sets the two forms side by side across governing unit, what travels, what stays, capital, measure of success and priority under stress. The short version: globalization measures success by throughput across a single planetary market; glocalization measures it by what each place holds and renews, with the global layer serving places.

Caveats

The word covers more than one arrangement. The managed integration of the Bretton Woods decades and the hyperglobalization after 1980 had different rules and different effects, and long-distance trade is far older than either. The page uses the word for the modern economic form, chiefly its post-1980 version.

The reading of globalization as the form of the acceleration phase is a structural inference. It inherits the status of the S-Curve Thesis, which the wiki holds as a working hypothesis. The trade figures are documented; their reading as a phase of a civilizational curve is interpretive. How much of the fall in global poverty globalization caused is disputed in the literature, and this page takes no figure for it.

Sources

Provenance

Written 7 November 2026 as the corollary to Glocalization, from Michael Haupt’s framing in the BioConomy project: globalization as an important part of the steep part of the S-curve, distinct from glocalization. Trade-share figures are from the World Bank world series (checked 7 November 2026). The dates for the WTO and China’s accession are matters of record. The periodization into a first wave, the Bretton Woods era and hyperglobalization follows common usage in economic history; no single source is adopted. Poverty figures were left out because the World Bank revised its poverty line in 2025 and the attribution of poverty reduction to globalization is contested. Updated 8 November 2026 with the value chain plateau, MGI’s trade-distance finding, Weber’s labor deviation and a pointer to the production-location brief, all drawn from that brief.