No currency in a record of 29 resource-tied and comparison currencies has been backed by water, and the reason is structural: the currencies monitored their accounts, the water arrangements that worked monitored the flow, and no case on either side put the monitoring of a resource in the hands of monitors accountable to the people holding the unit.

Overview

This brief reads two of the wiki’s case registers against each other. The Currency Case Register holds 29 currencies, vouchers, warehouse receipts and tokens whose value was tied to grain, tobacco, land, carbon or ecological work, with community currencies that had no resource behind them kept as comparisons. The Community Catchment Case Register holds the nine water cases the same research run found: water shares, irrigation turns, a self-imposed pumping fee, three markets in water rights and two payment schemes. Every case was checked against its sources on 10 November 2026, and every currency case was coded against the refined design principles of Cox, Arnold and Villamayor-Tomás (2010).

The record has a clear shape. Where a unit has been redeemable for something physical, the thing was stored and counted: tobacco in an inspected hogshead, maize in a certified warehouse. Where a unit has been tied to a living flow of water, it was a right held by the people who used the water, such as a timed turn at an Omani falaj or a metered acre-foot pumped in Colorado’s San Luis Valley, and none of those units circulated as money. The currencies people describe as ecological were backed by national money in reserve or by members’ promises to accept them, with the resource in the reason for issuing them. The tokens that claimed carbon as their backing drew the worst integrity record in the base.

One finding runs under all of these. In none of the 29 currency cases did monitors accountable to the people holding the unit watch the condition of the resource, the test Cox and colleagues call principle 4B. Where a resource was monitored at all, a state inspector, an exchange, an issuing NGO or the issuer itself did it. The water arrangements that lasted did something different: their unit was itself a measure of the flow or of the use made of it, and the users governed it. Each register holds half of what a water-tied currency would need, and no case holds both.

The strongest water result in the base also sets a limit. Irrigators in the San Luis Valley priced their own groundwater and cut pumping by about 30% against comparable farms, yet the aquifer stood 1.21 million acre-feet below its 2000 level in 2023. Users who price and meter their own use can reduce it without restoring the resource. A practitioner designing a local unit around water should read that case before any other.

Right of reply

This page describes communities, issuers, projects, organizations and public bodies only through their published records and statements. None has yet been invited to comment. Corrections and responses will be recorded on this page and on the case pages. On this site, [MS] marks a claim that rests on the account of the party the claim is about. Any monetary amount is recorded in the currency and year reported.

The question and the record

The research run behind this brief asked what happened when communities, cities, states or companies issued a unit of value tied to a natural resource, and above all to water. It coded 39 cases across four continents and three centuries. Thirty became currency pages; one of those, Curitiba’s Câmbio Verde, was later moved to the register’s nearest arrangements because no unit circulates there. Nine were water arrangements and joined the catchment register.

The second pass found the research run’s own record unreliable in places, and the brief rests on the corrected registers. Several figures had drifted between secondary sources: WIR’s history and membership, the year of Sardex’s trade figure, the units of Ghana’s warehouse volumes, the start date of the Kilifi commitment pools, and the velocity of Wörgl’s scrip. The section on how figures travel below sets out what changed.

GroupCasesWhat stood behind the unit
Water rights, fees and payments9user-held shares, turns and rights; a fee on metered pumping; tradeable rights; payments for verified activities
Grain and commodities7inspected or certified stock in a named warehouse
Land3land the notes were secured on
Carbon and nature tokens3modeled carbon credits
Ecological work3national money or members’ commitments, issued for cleanups and farm work
Comparison currencies13national money in reserve, or mutual credit among members

The distinctions

Backed, anchored or themed. A resource-backed currency is one a holder can redeem for the resource. A unit is backed if a holder can redeem it for the resource or a claim on it, anchored if a rule ties its issuance to a measured or modeled quantity of the resource, and themed if the resource appears only in its name, story or reasons for issue. In the currency register, 7 cases are backed by a stored commodity or by land, 4 more claim backing or rest on modeled carbon credits, 3 are themed, and 13 involve no natural resource at all. None is anchored to a measured change in a resource.

Stored commodity and living flow. Grain and tobacco can be counted into a warehouse and counted out again. Water in a channel or an aquifer cannot be held behind a note; the arrangements that tied value to it divided the flow in time or measured its use.

Measured and modeled. Inspected weight, timed turns and metered pumping are counted or measured. Carbon credits rest on baselines and counterfactuals that independent analysts have shown can be wrong.

Work-issued and outcome-issued. A unit issued for verified hours or completed works differs from one issued for a measured or modeled change in the resource. The wiki’s own designs use both.

Reserve, mutual credit and fiat. A currency held one for one by national money in a bank is a local voucher for national money. A mutual credit unit is backed by members’ obligation to accept it.

Bound and tradeable. A claim that can be sold only within a registered community stays in the place; one that can be sold to anyone can leave it.

Units honestly tied to water

Shares and turns held by the users

In the aflaj of Oman, flow is divided by time: a baddah of about 12 hours holds 24 athar of about half an hour, so a share is a turn at whatever the channel carries and a dry year shrinks every share at once. Private, state (bayt al-mal) and endowment (waqf) rights sit beside a common right of one full day, which the falaj committee under its wakil rents out to pay for maintenance: at weekly auctions in Falaj Daris and Falaj al-Malki, where 2018 prices at Daris ran from US$46.56 in summer to US$8.45 in winter, and on annual contracts in Falaj al-Khatmeen (Al-Marshoudi and Sulong 2024) [IC]. The system is also under strain: by 2014 ministers reported that a quarter of the aflaj counted in the 1990s had stopped flowing and a third had declined sharply, mainly because private boreholes lower the water table below the tunnels (Pearce 2015) [IC].

The Tribunal de las Aguas of Valencia, formed by nine irrigation communities on the Turia, has met every Thursday for centuries to settle disputes over turns, and Ostrom (1990) used the Valencian huerta among her long-enduring commons [IC]. Its rules govern river water downstream; the mountain catchment is outside them.

The acequias of northern New Mexico nest their governance onto the ditch system. Farm parcels and headgates are private, under strong community pressure and in some acequias written rules on whether they can be sold out of the community; each main canal, its water and the land around it are common property; and agreements between acequias govern shared headgates off the rivers (Cox 2014, Human Ecology) [IC]. Field studies find that about 60% of diverted water returns to the river as surface flow and 33% as shallow groundwater, recharging the aquifer and extending the season for users downstream (Rango et al. 2013) [IC].

A fee users set on their own pumping

In Subdistrict 1 of Colorado’s San Luis Valley, formed in 2006 when a majority of landowners by number and acreage petitioned for it, irrigators have paid a fee on each net acre-foot pumped since 2011, rising from US$45 to US$150 by 2017, with part of the income paying for fallowing (Smith and Andersson 2025) [IC]. The case is treated in its own section below.

Rights that trade

Three markets in water rights show what happens when the claim can leave the place. In Chile, the 1981 Water Code separated rights from land and made them property; in the Copiapó valley the state granted paper rights to several times the annual recharge, the price of water more than tripled between 2000 and 2011, and mining firms bought irrigation rights at prices farmers could not match (Bauer 2015) [IC]. The 2022 reform made drinking water and sanitation a human right with priority over other uses and limited new grants to 30 years, while keeping existing rights in force (Ley 21.435) [IC]. In the Murray-Darling Basin, trade averages more than A$1.8 billion a year, and the national competition regulator found manipulation and insider trading inadequately regulated and the markets easiest to use for professional traders and large agribusinesses (ACCC 2021) [IC]. California’s 1991 Drought Water Bank, a water bank, bought over 820,000 acre-feet, mainly from Delta farmers, and sold almost 390,000 to 12 agencies, with about 150,000 acres taken out of production in the selling areas (Lund et al. 1992; Legislative Analyst’s Office 1991) [IC].

Payments for verified work

Two payment schemes come closest to a flow that could carry a local unit. In Paro, Bhutan, hotels and a water association pay a village watershed group Nu 142,000 only after a verification team confirms four agreed activities, and no water measurement was found (SNV 2015) [IC]. In Los Negros, Bolivia, irrigators, the municipality and donors pay upstream households in kind for conservation [MS]. Both pay for work verified by inspection. Neither measures the water.

Stored commodities, land and tokens

Stored commodities. Under Virginia’s 1730 inspection act, notes issued for inspected tobacco in public warehouses became the only lawful tender for debts payable in tobacco, and bad tobacco was burned in the inspectors’ presence [IC]. Modern warehouse receipt systems (Malawi’s, for example) in Ghana, Malawi, Ethiopia, Tanzania and South Africa tie each receipt to a named stock. Their record on who benefits is consistent: in Malawi, large traders took out the most receipts and deposited the largest volumes, only 48% of receipts made a profit, and maize depositors who borrowed against their receipts lost about 7.4% on average (Thunde and Baulch 2020) [IC]; in Ghana, receipts covered about 1.2% of national maize production in 2015 and loans went mostly to corporate bodies and large traders (Aboagye 2023) [IC]. The receipts serve as collateral and settlement among traders and banks. None circulates as household money.

Land. The assignats, secured on church lands nationalized in 1789, grew from 400 million livres in circulation to a cap of 40 billion by December 1795; the mandats territoriaux that replaced them in March 1796 traded at about 20% of face value within a month, and France returned to metal money in February 1797 [IC]. The Massachusetts Land Bank of 1740 issued bills against members’ mortgages and was wound up by the colonial authorities [IC]. Land made a poor backing because nothing tied the quantity of notes to the land behind them.

Carbon and nature tokens. Through Toucan, over 21.6 million Verra credits were moved on chain by April 2022, and CarbonPlan found that about 28%, some 6.0 million tons of CO₂-equivalent, came from “zombie” projects with no other recent buyers; Verra banned tokens based on retired credits on 25 May 2022 [IC]. KlimaDAO described KLIMA as a “carbon-backed, algorithmic cryptocurrency” [MS], and its price fell from over US$1,000 to near US$20 by April 2022 [IC]. A working paper on Regen Network records that scientists questioned the soil-carbon credits it sold to Microsoft and that on one project Regen-related entities filled every role, including monitor [TBV].

Work-issued units and comparison currencies

Ecological work. Eco-Pesa in Mombasa paid residents one 5 Eco-Pesa note per filled trash bag, held a full shilling reserve, removed about 20 tonnes of waste in two events, and ended when the issued notes were redeemed for the donor funds [MS]. Bangla-Pesa, a mutual credit network with a community fund for cleanup work, was banned in May 2013, its founders were jailed and charged, and it relaunched in November 2013 after the charges were dropped [IC]. The Kilifi commitment pools record rotating farm labor and tree planting in members’ own reports; no resource outcome has been measured [MS]. Curitiba’s Câmbio Verde, an in-kind exchange of recyclables for food, collected 31,258.82 tonnes from 1991 to 2001 (Takeda et al. 2013) [IC]; it is recorded among the register’s nearest arrangements.

Comparison currencies. The WIR cooperative has issued mutual credit to Swiss small and medium enterprises since 1934, dropped demurrage in 1948, and turns over more when the economy slows (Stodder 2009; Stodder and Lietaer 2016) [IC]. Sarafu, a Community Inclusion Currency, recorded about 300 million Sarafu of transactions among some 55,000 accounts in 2020 and 2021, with circulation highly local and community institutions acting as hubs (Mattsson et al. 2022, 2023) [IC]. The Chiemgauer, Bristol Pound and Banco Palmas are reserve-backed vouchers for national money. Wörgl’s labor certificates paid for public works in 1932 and 1933, with only 12,000 schillings ever issued against an equal schilling deposit, until the Administrative Court ended the scheme (von Muralt 1934) [IC].

The 4B gap

Principle 4B of the refined design principles asks whether “monitors who are accountable to the users monitor the condition of the resource.” Read strictly, it is present in none of the 29 currency cases.

Case or groupWho monitored the resourceAccountable to holders?
Virginia tobacco notesinspectors appointed under the colonial actno
Warehouse receipts (five systems)certified warehouses, exchanges, a state licensing boardnot shown on any page
Assignats and mandatsnobody checked the notes against the landno
Toucan, KlimaDAOthe protocols relied on Verra’s issuanceno
Regen Networkon one project, Regen-related entitiesno
Eco-Pesathe issuing NGO counted bags and tonnesno
Kilifi commitment poolsmembers’ own reports; nothing measuredno monitoring

The water arrangements in the catchment register were not coded on the same principles, so the comparison is drawn from their descriptions. In each of them the unit is itself a measure of the water or of the use made of it: a timed turn at a falaj, a turn on a Valencian canal, a metered acre-foot in Colorado. The acequias are run by elected commissioners and a mayordomo within each ditch, and Cox reads their governance as nested onto the ditch system (Cox and Ross 2011; Cox 2014) [IC]. Cox (2012) observes that environmental monitoring matters across many kinds of system, independent of the variables in his theories of fit [IC].

The gap explains much of the zero. A currency tied to a living resource needs someone to say how much of the resource there is, and in every case where that someone answered to the issuer or the state, holders had no way to check the claim behind their unit. The carbon tokens show the result when the monitoring is outsourced entirely: the cheapest eligible credits filled the pool.

San Luis Valley: pricing use without restoring the resource

Smith, Andersson, Cody, Cox and Ficklin (2017) found that farmers in Subdistrict 1 pumped 32% less than comparable farmers outside it after the fee began, and a well-level analysis for 2011 to 2021 found the effect held at about 30% even as the fee doubled. The nominal reduction was closer to 10%, because pumping outside the subdistrict rose while surface supplies fell. Fallowing paid from fee income accounts for about 9% of the reductions since 2016 (Smith and Andersson 2025) [IC].

The aquifer did not recover. It reached its lowest point in 2013, regained ground through 2017, and lost most of those gains in the 2018 drought, “with diminished recharge and increased pumping” (Allen and Smith 2023) [IC]. In 2023 it held 1.21 million acre-feet less than in 2000; without the fee and fallowing, the authors estimate the loss would have been 2.38 million. Their own verdict is that the fee “has not delivered on stabilizing, let alone recovering, the aquifer” (Smith and Andersson 2025) [IC]. In 2024 the irrigators decided to raise the fee to US$500 an acre-foot, a step the authors read as a move toward a cap with tradeable pumping allowances; the plan went to water court in 2026, with groundwater-only producers, about 14% of parcels, arguing that it puts the burden on them (Inside Climate News 2026) [IC].

The case is the base’s reference for users pricing their own use and keeping the proceeds under their own rules. It also shows that a unit tied to measured water use can be honest and effective at cutting use while the resource itself keeps declining.

Fit for a flow

Institutional fit, as Cox (2012) defines it, has no single overall form. He argues that there is no single overall fit: each theory of fit links features of a system to a particular outcome. Three of his theories, and one extension the register adds, sort the cases.

Spatiotemporal fit. Where a resource varies across space and time, users need flexible access. The athar fits a variable flow because a share is a turn at whatever arrives. The aflaj also show the arrangement for trading shares tracking the flow: the two aflaj whose flow varies most rent their common right at weekly auctions, while Falaj al-Khatmeen, whose flow is steadier on the ministry’s records, rents it to fixed renters on annual contracts, and its community declined an official proposal to start an auction (Al-Marshoudi and Sulong 2024 [IC]; Al-Marshoudi 2018 [TBV]).

Spatial nesting fit. Cox’s own example is the Taos acequias, whose layers of governance mirror the branching of the ditches.

Extent fit. Warehouse receipts fit well: each names a stock in a named warehouse. The carbon tokens fit badly: the tokens were global and permanent while the credits behind them came from projects anywhere.

Quantity fit, the register’s own extension of extent fit, asks whether the number of units moves with the quantity of the resource. The assignats are the clearest failure: the notes multiplied while the land behind them stayed fixed.

A unit tied to a seasonal spring would need spatiotemporal and quantity fit at once, and the only cases that achieved both were water shares that never circulated as money.

Keeping the claim in the place

Claims sold to buyers outside the community moved value and control away. In Chile, mining outbid farming for irrigation rights; in the Murray-Darling, the markets favored professional traders; the carbon tokens carried claims on distant forests into global pools.

The acequias, often cited as the pattern, need a correction. The research instructions held that the Taos acequias weakened after water rights became individually held and saleable. Cox’s work finds a different picture. Members ranked “water markets and pressure to sell water rights” seventh of eleven disturbances, a pressure Cox notes “was lower than expected,” behind drought, newcomers who do not recognize acequia traditions and falling participation; the acequias produce less than they did and have mostly lost their common pastures; and Hispano members were most concerned about the state’s adjudication of each individual water right (Cox 2014, Global Environmental Change) [IC]. Acequias whose land was subdivided among new residents performed worse (Cox and Ross 2011) [IC].

The bounded markets lasted. Omani athar trade within the community, and acequia members keep rules and pressure on selling land and headgates out of the community. Cox’s Common Boundaries (2024), which treats which environmental claims can be held as property and made tradeable, could not be obtained for this brief, and its argument is not applied here.

The state and survival

Eleven currency cases ended. Three were closed by the state, all before 1945: the WÄRA, forbidden by the Reich finance ministry in October 1931; Wörgl, after the state bank objected and the Administrative Court ruled in 1933; and the Massachusetts Land Bank, wound up by the colonial authorities [IC]. Four ended through funding or falling use (Bristol, Eco-Pesa, Ithaca HOURS, American stamp scrip), two through over-issue (the assignats and mandats), and two through integrity failure (Toucan, after a private standard-setter withdrew support, and KlimaDAO). Bangla-Pesa and Banco Palmas survived state action through dropped charges and a court win [IC]. All three cases where an authority challenged the right to organize ended.

How figures travel

The second pass checked every source behind the register and found the second-hand record unreliable in ways a practitioner should expect to meet elsewhere.

Figure as repeatedWhat the sources show
Wörgl scrip circulated fourteen times faster than the schillingno measurement exists; the eyewitness account found a third of the notes kept by collectors (von Muralt 1934)
Wörgl repaid 79,000 of 118,000 schillings of tax arrearsthe mayor’s claim, which the provincial offices could not confirm (von Muralt 1934)
WIR renounced Gesell’s doctrine in 1952; 68,000 members, CHF 1.6 billion turnover in 2009WIR dropped demurrage in 1948; the 2009 figures appear in neither of Stodder’s papers
Sardex mediated €51 million in 2013the figure is for 2015 (Motta et al. 2017)
Ghana’s warehouses issued 47,000 receipts in 201647,000 tonnes (Thunde and Baulch 2020)
Taos acequias weakened through water-right salesmembers rated that pressure moderate (Cox 2014)
Falaj al-Khatmeen’s 865 athar split 309.5 state and 129 waqfabout 862 athar: 335 private, 398 state, 33 waqf, 96 common (Al-Marshoudi and Sulong 2024)

The Wörgl velocity figure had reached five wiki pages before the second pass corrected them. The lesson for the wiki is procedural: a figure enters a brief only after someone reads its first source.

The predictions

The research instructions set nine predictions. They are graded here against the corrected registers.

PredictionVerdictGradeStatus
P1Few currencies backed by a living resourcesupported[IC]academic-inference
P2Stored commodities can back a unit; living flows cannot without a proxysupported, with a caveat[IC]academic-inference
P3Work-backed units last longer and draw fewer integrity disputesdisputes supported; lifespan not[IC] / [TBV]working-hypothesis
P4Tradeable claims move value and control out of the placepartly supported[IC] for the casesworking-hypothesis
P5Higher design-principle scores go with longer lifenot testable, except principle 7[TBV]working-hypothesis
P6Demurrage speeds circulationnot supported[TBV]speculative-projection
P7State tolerance decides survival more often than designnot supported overall[IC] for the casesacademic-inference
P8Currencies tied to ecological work produce measured change in the resourcenot supported[IC]academic-inference
P9Issuer claims match independent measurementnot matched[IC]academic-inference

P1. Dominant backing across the 29 currency cases: 9 mutual credit, 8 stored commodity, 8 national-money reserve, 3 land, 1 modeled change, none anchored to a measured change. All nine water cases are rights, fees or payments. The wiki can say: no documented currency has been redeemable for water or tied by rule to a measured flow.

P2. The receipt systems tie each unit to a named stock, but where the page shows who did the counting, it was a state inspector, an exchange or the issuer. Living flows were handled as time shares or metered volumes, never as money. The wiki can say: stored commodities have backed money, counted by monitors who answered to someone other than the holders.

P3. All three modeled-outcome units drew integrity disputes within a few years; none of the four work-issued units did. Two of the four work-issued units ended, through state closure and the end of donor funds. The wiki can say: work-issued units have drawn no integrity disputes, and their survival has depended on funding and the state.

P4. Chile, the Murray-Darling and the carbon tokens support it. The bounded markets in Oman and the acequias are counter-cases, and the Taos reference pattern does not hold as the instructions stated it. The wiki can say: claims sold to outside buyers moved value and control away; markets bounded by the community have lasted.

P5. Under strict coding most scores are unknown, and the longest-lived currencies show one or two principles present on the page. Principle 3 is present only in three cases that ended, through the rule that elected representatives count as collective choice. Principle 7 is the one consistent signal. The wiki can say: where an authority challenged the right to organize, the scheme ended; the cases do not show a wider link.

P6. No independent measurement shows demurrage raising velocity. Godschalk (2011) finds that the data “does not yet allow statements on the effects of demurrage on the velocity,” and WIR circulates without it. The wiki can say: the velocity effect of demurrage is unmeasured.

P7. State action ended three of eleven cases, all before 1945; recent closures came through funding, falling use or integrity failure. The wiki can say: the state ended the best-known early demurrage currencies, while recent schemes ended in other ways.

P8. No currency in the register measured a change in a living resource. The nearest evidence comes from the San Luis Valley fee, which is a price on use, and from waste tonnages. The wiki can say: no currency case shows a measured effect on a living resource.

P9. Issuer and promoter claims outran independent work in every flagship case examined, and the second-hand record compounded the gap. The wiki can say: for the flagship cases, independent evidence is thinner than the claims.

The cases

Showing 29 of 29 entries
CaseCountryBackingBacked, anchored or themedMeasurementPrinciples presentPrinciples absentFitPersistenceGrade
Resource group grain-and-commodities7
ACE Warehouse Receipts, MalawiMalawiK1backedcounted, graded1Bgoodrunning since 2011[IC]
Ethiopia Commodity Exchange ReceiptsEthiopiaK1backedcounted, graded1B4Agoodrunning; national system from 2026[IC]
Ghana Grains Council Warehouse ReceiptsGhanaK1backedcounted, graded1Bgoodrunning[IC]
Ptolemaic Grain BankingEgyptK1 (claimed)backed (claimed)unknownUunknown[TBV]
SAFEX Electronic Silo CertificatesSouth AfricaK1backedcounted1Bgoodrunning[TBV]
Tanzania Warehouse Receipt SystemTanzaniaK1backedcounted1B, 2B, 8goodrunning[IC]
Virginia Tobacco NotesUSA, VirginiaK1backedcounted, graded1B, 2B, 61A, 4A, 4Bpartial~25 yrs as money[IC]
Resource group land3
AssignatsFranceK2, then fiatbacked, then fiatdeclared1B, 31A, 4A, 4Bmismatch7 yrs[IC]
Mandats TerritoriauxFranceK2backeddeclared1B, 31Amismatch<1 yr[IC]
Massachusetts Land BankUSA, MassachusettsK2 (secured, not redeemable)backed (claimed)declared1B7U1 yr[IC]
Resource group no-resource-backing13
Banco Palmas and the PalmaBrazil, FortalezaK6nonenone7, 8n/a26 yrs[IC]
Bristol PoundUK, BristolK6nonenonen/a9 yrs[IC]
ChiemgauerGermany, BavariaK6nonenonen/a23 yrs[MS]
Community Exchange SystemSouth Africa, Cape TownK7nonenone1A, 8n/a23 yrs[TBV]
Fureai KippuJapanK7nonenone1A, 8n/aover 50 yrs; stalled after 2000[IC]
Ithaca HOURSUSA, New YorkK7nonenone1An/a~20 yrs[TBV]
K'MaliSouth Africa, KokstadK7nonenonen/aunknown[TBV]
Sarafu Community Inclusion CurrencyKenyaK7, K6 partialnonenone4An/a9 yrs[IC]
SardexItaly, SardiniaK7nonenone1An/a17 yrs[IC]
Stamp Scrip in the United StatesUSAK6nonenonen/a~1 yr[TBV]
WÄRAGermanyK6nonenone7n/a~5 yrs[IC]
WIR BankSwitzerlandK7nonenone1An/a92 yrs[IC]
Wörgl Labor CertificatesAustria, WörglK6+K3nonenone1A, 3, 4A7n/a14 months[IC]
Resource group ecological-work3
Bangla-PesaKenya, MombasaK7+K3themednone1A, 7n/a13 yrs; banned May 2013, relaunched November 2013[IC]
Eco-PesaKenya, MombasaK6+K3themedcounted1A, 2B, 74A, 4Bpartial~1 yr[MS]
Grassroots Economics Commitment PoolsKenya, KilifiK7+K3, K6 partialthemeddeclared84BUabout 3 yrs on Celo[MS]
Resource group carbon-and-nature-tokens3
KlimaDAOglobalK6 (BCT reserve)+K5anchored to modeled creditsmodel1A, 1B, 4Bmismatchrunning, reduced[IC]
Regen Network EcocreditsglobalK5+K4anchored to monitored or modeled changemodel, instrument4BUrunning[MS]
Toucan Base Carbon TonneglobalK1+K5backed by claims on modeled creditsmodel1A, 1B, 2A, 3, 4Bmismatch~7 months[IC]
Showing 9 of 9 entries
CaseCountryValue flowWater outcomeWater evidenceFailure, capture or harmGrade
Acequias of Northern New MexicoUnited StatesMembers' labor and feesAbout 60% of diverted water returns to the river as surface flow, 33% as shallow groundwater and 7% is lost to evapotranspiration; seepage recharges the aquifer at about 1,169 mm a year; return flow delays runoffE3Individual quantification of water rights in the Abeyta adjudication; land subdivision by newcomers; urban growth; loss of common pastures; water markets rated a moderate pressure[IC]
Aflaj of OmanOmanWater shares held as timed turns (athar) and bought, sold and rented within the community (about USD 3,000 for 30 minutes a week in one village); a common right of one day's flow is rented at weekly auctions (Daris, al-Malki) or on annual contracts (al-Khatmeen) to fund maintenanceAbout a quarter of aflaj stopped flowing and a third declined sharply since the 1990s inventory (ministers, 2014)E5Private boreholes lower water tables below the tunnels[IC]
California Drought Water Bank of 1991United StatesThe Department of Water Resources bought water from 348 sellers, mostly Delta farmers, and sold it to 12 agencies; eligible buyers were urban areas receiving under 75% of normal supply and farm areas facing permanent production lossesOver 820,000 acre-feet bought and almost 390,000 sold; the rest went to Delta instream flows and carryover storage for 1992 (Lund et al. 1992)E5Farmland taken out of production in selling areas; third-party effects not assessed in the sources read[IC]
Chile's Water Rights MarketChileRights granted by the state water directorate (DGA) and then bought and sold; mining firms bought irrigation rights at prices farmers could not matchIn the Copiapó valley the DGA granted paper rights to several times more groundwater than is recharged each year; the market price of water there more than tripled between 2000 and 2011 (Bauer 2015, citing Bitran et al. 2014)E4Over-allocation of groundwater; transfer of irrigation rights to mining; hydropower's precedence over other uses where dams are present; weak coordination and conflict resolution[IC]
Los Negros Reciprocal Water AgreementBoliviaIrrigators, municipality, donors pay in kind into municipal fundNot measured independentlyE5Donor co-funding throughout[MS]
Murray-Darling Basin Water MarketAustraliaWater rights and allocations traded among irrigators, investors, environmental water holders and other buyers, at an average of over AUD 1.8 billion a year (2012-13 to 2019-20, in 2019-20 dollars)Not measured in the source read; trade rules do not reflect storage and delivery capacity, causing river channel congestion with third-party and environmental impacts (ACCC 2021)E5Manipulation and insider trading not adequately regulated; few conduct rules and no single overseeing agency; no evidence found of investors using market power to raise prices in the Southern Connected Basin (ACCC 2021)[IC]
Paro Watershed PaymentBhutanFive hotels and the Satsham Water Association pay the Namey Nichu Watershed Management Group (29 households) Nu 142,000, only after the PES Verification Team confirms the agreed activities; the community forest group manages the moneyNot measured; obligations are activity-basedE5Second-phase consultations raised concerns about water allocation to hotels and equitable distribution; hotel development near Taktsang[IC]
San Luis Valley Groundwater Subdistrict 1United StatesIrrigators on about 160,000 irrigated acres pay a fee per net acre-foot pumped, with credit for surface water put toward aquifer recharge (USD 45 in 2011, USD 75 in 2012, USD 90 in 2015, USD 150 since 2017); part of the income funds local fallowing, alongside federal CREP funds from 2016Pumping about 30% below a counterfactual from comparable farms (32% in Smith et al. 2017; 30.4% by difference-in-differences; nominal reduction closer to 10%); aquifer storage fell to a low in 2013, most gains were lost in the 2018 drought, and storage stood 1.21 million acre-feet below 2000 in 2023, against an estimated 2.38 million without the subdistrict's measures (Allen and Smith 2023; Smith and Andersson 2025); record low in August 2026E2Fee has not stabilized the aquifer; cost of reductions contested between groundwater-only producers and those with surface rights; state engineer can curtail pumping if sustainability goals are missed by 2031[IC]
Tribunal de las Aguas of ValenciaSpainMembers' feesNot measuredE5Urbanization of huerta[IC]

The first tab lists the currency cases by resource group with their backing, measurement, design-principle scores and fit. The second lists the water rights, fees and payments with their value flows and water outcomes. Each case page gives the full coding and sources; the coding rules and the basis for every score are on the Currency Case Register page.

Evidence the claims must face

  1. Small numbers. Eco-Pesa issued US$352 over three months among about 20,000 residents. WIR’s credit balances in 2003 were about 0.165% of Swiss M2.
  2. National money underneath. The Chiemgauer, Bristol Pound, Banco Palmas, Eco-Pesa and Wörgl’s certificates were held one for one by national money.
  3. Self-reported totals. The commitment pool counts, Chiemgauer velocity and Eco-Pesa’s income figures come from the issuers [MS].
  4. Unknown scores. Most design-principle scores are unknown under the strict coding, so the absence of a pattern in P5 may reflect thin case descriptions.
  5. Downstream losses. The water retention evidence brief found that dense retention can reduce the water reaching users downstream. A unit that rewards retention upstream can move value away from people below.
  6. Exclusion. Warehouse receipts served large traders; Sarafu needed a phone; the Bristol Pound reached about 0.02% of the city’s population by one report.

Applying the findings (the wiki’s reading)

This section is the wiki’s own reading of the cases for a community designing a unit tied to a local water resource. It draws inferences beyond what the cases show directly.

  • Issue the unit for verified work, and back it with something holders already trust. Work-issued units drew no integrity disputes; Bangla-Pesa and the Kilifi pools back theirs with members’ commitments, the model of a commitment pool, and Eco-Pesa and Wörgl with national money. Their survival depended on funding and on the state, so plan for both before launch.
  • Keep the water record separate from the unit, and give it to monitors the users choose. This is the step no case in the base took. A register of readings at named springs and wells, with a baseline and instruments, kept by people accountable to the unit’s holders, would supply what principle 4B asks for. Report the readings beside the currency and keep the unit’s value off them.
  • Do not let the unit’s value float on a modeled volume of retained water. The carbon tokens show what a modeled backing does when the model is wrong and the monitoring sits elsewhere.
  • If any part of the unit is tied to water, use the logic of a share of flow. A turn at whatever arrives fits a seasonal resource; a permanent claim does not. Expiry or demurrage can shorten a unit’s life to match a season, though the evidence that demurrage speeds circulation is missing.
  • Keep claims inside a registered community. The athar and the acequias show bounded markets that lasted; Chile and the tokens show claims that left.
  • Expect pricing and monitoring to cut use without restoring the resource on their own, and count the users downstream before rewarding retention upstream.
  • On the wiki’s own frameworks: Bioregional Currency describes a unit “denominated in the ecological and coordination capacity of a specific place,” and the Emancipation Architecture calls for an “ecologically backed” demurrage currency earned through verified regenerative work. The cases support the earning half, issuance for verified work. No case supports ecological backing or a unit denominated in ecological capacity. Regenerative Participation Income has no case with a measured change in the resource; the nearest arrangement is Curitiba’s exchange of recyclables for food.

Summary of claims

ClaimGradeRecommended statusSafe for the wiki
No documented currency was redeemable for water or tied by rule to a measured flow[IC]academic-inferenceyes
In no currency case did monitors accountable to holders watch the resource (principle 4B)[IC]academic-inferenceyes, under the strict coding
Units honestly tied to water were user-held shares, turns and fees that did not circulate as money[IC]academic-inferenceyes
The San Luis Valley fee cut pumping by about 30% against a counterfactual while the aquifer kept falling[IC]documented-factyes
Stored commodities backed money where inspection made counting possible[IC]documented-factyes
The assignats failed through issue far beyond the land[IC]documented-factyes
About 28% of Toucan-bridged credits came from zombie projects; Verra banned the mechanism in May 2022[IC]documented-factyes
Work-issued units drew no integrity disputes[IC]academic-inferencewith caveat (four cases)
Claims sold to outside buyers moved value out of the place[IC] for the casesworking-hypothesiswith caveat
The Taos acequias weakened mainly through water-right salescontradictednoneno
Demurrage raises velocity[TBV]speculative-projectionno
Wörgl’s scrip circulated fourteen times faster than the schillingcontradictednoneno
A currency can be backed by water retained on the landno casespeculative-projectionno

Sources

Full citations for every case are on the case pages. The works the brief’s argument rests on:

Governance and fit

Water rights, fees and markets

Commodities, land and tokens

Currencies

Provenance

Written on 10 November 2026 from the resource-backed currencies research run of the same day and the two registers built from it. The run’s 39-row case table was split between the Currency Case Register (29 cases, after Câmbio Verde moved to its nearest arrangements) and the Community Catchment Case Register (nine water cases, four of them new). Every case was checked against its sources the same day, and the currency cases were coded under the rules on the register’s index page, against Table 4 of Cox, Arnold and Villamayor-Tomás (2010) and the theories of fit in Cox (2012). The run’s nine predictions were re-graded against the corrected registers; five verdicts changed from the run’s own.

Editorial decisions: the working title in the instructions was replaced, and the brief embeds a base filtered to its own cases in place of a copied case table. The Taos reference pattern in the instructions was corrected against Cox and Ross (2011) and Cox (2014). Cox (2024), Common Boundaries, and Broer (2007), Schwundgeld, could not be obtained, and neither is used. The example valley that prompted the run, and all figures for it, are kept off this page; material on one place belongs on the W2DF register or the BioHubs directory.