| Acequias of Northern New Mexico | United States | Members' labor and fees | About 60% of diverted water returns to the river as surface flow, 33% as shallow groundwater and 7% is lost to evapotranspiration; seepage recharges the aquifer at about 1,169 mm a year; return flow delays runoff | E3 | Individual quantification of water rights in the Abeyta adjudication; land subdivision by newcomers; urban growth; loss of common pastures; water markets rated a moderate pressure | [IC] |
| Aflaj of Oman | Oman | Water shares held as timed turns (athar) and bought, sold and rented within the community (about USD 3,000 for 30 minutes a week in one village); a common right of one day's flow is rented at weekly auctions (Daris, al-Malki) or on annual contracts (al-Khatmeen) to fund maintenance | About a quarter of aflaj stopped flowing and a third declined sharply since the 1990s inventory (ministers, 2014) | E5 | Private boreholes lower water tables below the tunnels | [IC] |
| California Drought Water Bank of 1991 | United States | The Department of Water Resources bought water from 348 sellers, mostly Delta farmers, and sold it to 12 agencies; eligible buyers were urban areas receiving under 75% of normal supply and farm areas facing permanent production losses | Over 820,000 acre-feet bought and almost 390,000 sold; the rest went to Delta instream flows and carryover storage for 1992 (Lund et al. 1992) | E5 | Farmland taken out of production in selling areas; third-party effects not assessed in the sources read | [IC] |
| Chile's Water Rights Market | Chile | Rights granted by the state water directorate (DGA) and then bought and sold; mining firms bought irrigation rights at prices farmers could not match | In the Copiapó valley the DGA granted paper rights to several times more groundwater than is recharged each year; the market price of water there more than tripled between 2000 and 2011 (Bauer 2015, citing Bitran et al. 2014) | E4 | Over-allocation of groundwater; transfer of irrigation rights to mining; hydropower's precedence over other uses where dams are present; weak coordination and conflict resolution | [IC] |
| Los Negros Reciprocal Water Agreement | Bolivia | Irrigators, municipality, donors pay in kind into municipal fund | Not measured independently | E5 | Donor co-funding throughout | [MS] |
| Murray-Darling Basin Water Market | Australia | Water rights and allocations traded among irrigators, investors, environmental water holders and other buyers, at an average of over AUD 1.8 billion a year (2012-13 to 2019-20, in 2019-20 dollars) | Not measured in the source read; trade rules do not reflect storage and delivery capacity, causing river channel congestion with third-party and environmental impacts (ACCC 2021) | E5 | Manipulation and insider trading not adequately regulated; few conduct rules and no single overseeing agency; no evidence found of investors using market power to raise prices in the Southern Connected Basin (ACCC 2021) | [IC] |
| Paro Watershed Payment | Bhutan | Five hotels and the Satsham Water Association pay the Namey Nichu Watershed Management Group (29 households) Nu 142,000, only after the PES Verification Team confirms the agreed activities; the community forest group manages the money | Not measured; obligations are activity-based | E5 | Second-phase consultations raised concerns about water allocation to hotels and equitable distribution; hotel development near Taktsang | [IC] |
| San Luis Valley Groundwater Subdistrict 1 | United States | Irrigators on about 160,000 irrigated acres pay a fee per net acre-foot pumped, with credit for surface water put toward aquifer recharge (USD 45 in 2011, USD 75 in 2012, USD 90 in 2015, USD 150 since 2017); part of the income funds local fallowing, alongside federal CREP funds from 2016 | Pumping about 30% below a counterfactual from comparable farms (32% in Smith et al. 2017; 30.4% by difference-in-differences; nominal reduction closer to 10%); aquifer storage fell to a low in 2013, most gains were lost in the 2018 drought, and storage stood 1.21 million acre-feet below 2000 in 2023, against an estimated 2.38 million without the subdistrict's measures (Allen and Smith 2023; Smith and Andersson 2025); record low in August 2026 | E2 | Fee has not stabilized the aquifer; cost of reductions contested between groundwater-only producers and those with surface rights; state engineer can curtail pumping if sustainability goals are missed by 2031 | [IC] |
| Tribunal de las Aguas of Valencia | Spain | Members' fees | Not measured | E5 | Urbanization of huerta | [IC] |